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This chapter focuses on how British judges have interpreted legislation 
on the rights of employees and workers. It begins by setting out the context: 
the legislation largely enacted by Conservative governments and the court 
system. Then it explains how on the one hand, judges have bolstered the 
employer’s prerogative, that is the employer’s right to manage unilaterally 
in respect of dismissal and have not used their discretion to maintain 
tripartism. Moreover, mostly they have interpreted draconian legislation 
on strikes and industrial action short of a strike in the employer’s favour.
On the other hand, British judges have stopped the government from 
charging hefty fees for Employment Tribunals thus enabling access to 
justice, as well as furthering the rights of some workers on zero hours 
contracts in the gig economy. Accordingly, this chapter finds that British 
judges have a mixed and varied record in respect of furthering workers’ 
rights and concludes by making some observations on the future direction 
of British labour law.
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I. Background
A. The legislative context
The Conservative party has been in power for most of the last 40 years 
and, as a result, British workers now have less rights in respect of industrial 
action than many workers in other European countries. Even when the 
Labour party was in power from 1997-2010, it merely simplified certain 
provisions on union ballots for strikes; it did not repeal the laws curtailing 
strike action that had been introduced by their Conservative predecessors. 
These include restrictions on picketing and on sympathy strikes (1980 
Employment Act); employers being given the right to sue unions for 
damages (1982 Employment Act); secret ballots before industrial action 
(1984 Trade Union Act); enabling union members to seek injunctions if 
there had not been a pre-strike ballot (1988 Employment Act); restrictions 
on time off with pay for union duties (1989 Employment Act); the closure 
of loopholes in respect of sympathy action (1990 Employment Act); 
provisions in respect of unions giving the employer seven days’ notice 
of strike ballots and industrial action (1993 Trade Union Reform and 
Employment Rights Act).
When the Conservatives resumed power after a period in coalition, they 
passed the even more restrictive 2016 Trade Union Act which, inter alia, 
required that:
– trade unions give 14 days’ notice of strike action, (instead of seven 
days as before);
– in « important public services »1,(not just « essential » public services) 
at least 40 per cent of those entitled to vote must vote in favour of 
action, (instead of a simple majority as before);
– any affirmative ballot can only validate industrial action for six 
months, beginning with the date the ballot closes.
As can be seen from this summary, (which includes some, but by no 
means all of the provisions), a union now has to meet intricate conditions 
for lawful industrial action and the Trades Union Congress has described the 
2016 changes as making « legal strikes close to impossible »2.
Strikes apart, other restrictions by Conservative governments include 
cutting the period by half during which the employer is required to 
consult with workers’ representatives over redundancy: from 90 days to 
45 days. Also, it doubled the period before which an employee could 
claim unfair dismissal on certain grounds. Until 2012 the employee 
1 Specified as health, education, transport, border security and fire-fighting.
2 Trades Union Congress, press releases, 12 May 2015, 16 December 2015.
British Judges and Workers’ Rights    
81
Collection « Transition & Justice »
could claim unfair dismissal for conduct, capability or redundancy or 
some other substantial reason after one year of continuous employment 
with the same employer. The Conservatives changed this to two years 
continuous employment.
Table 1 shows an index of the strictness of employment protection 
calculated by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).
Table I. OECD index of employment protection3
Country








United Kingdom 1.10 0.38
Unsurprisingly, the index demonstrates that employment protection in 
the United Kingdom is lower than that of many other European countries.
B. The court system
Figure 1 below displays the civil court system in the United Kingdom. 
At the base are Employment Tribunals. Unlike the conseils de prud’hommes, 
they cover the public sector as well as the private sector and civil servants 
at all levels. Moreover, almost a third of the cases they hear include a 
discrimination claim4 as there is no mediation body akin to the French 
Défenseur des Droits. An appeal from the Employment Tribunal goes to the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal, but only on a point of law. Permission is 
necessary to appeal further and again it is only on a point of law.
3 Source: OECD https://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.
htm.
 Index calculated as for 2013. [accessed 3.12.2019]. For more details see https://www.oecd.org/els/
emp/All.pdf.
 The indicators have been compiled using the OECD’s Secretariat’s own reading of statutory laws, 
collective bargaining agreements and case law, as well as contributions from officials from OECD 
member countries and advice from country experts.
4 Ministry of Justice, Employment Tribunal Receipts, Tables Annex C, 2019.
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The Supreme Court (formerly known as the House of Lords) 
comprises 12 judges. At the time of writing, three are women, including 
the President. It covers the entire United Kingdom, but there are some 
variations by country in the lower courts, both in nomenclature and in 
substance5.
A key factor differentiating the UK from continental Europe is the fact 
that the UK is a common law country and there is a doctrine of precedent, 
where a decision of the higher court binds the courts below it. Under a civil 
law system, as in France, Italy, and Germany, the decision of the higher court 
guides the decisions of the courts below. Another differentiating factor is 
that in the UK there is no career judiciary. A person has to have been legally 
qualified and have had at least five years of legal experience before becoming 
a judge. In practice most judges have had more than five years’ experience 
and generally start on a part-time basis before they apply to be a full-time 
salaried judge. This should in theory make judges more rooted in the real 
world.
5 Most employment law cases go to the courts underlined. Northern Ireland does not have an Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunal; its Employment Tribunals are called Industrial Tribunals and it has a Fair 
Employment Tribunal to deal with claims of discrimination on grounds of religion or political 
opinion. Scotland has a Court of Session, instead of a Court of Appeal and its Sheriff court replaces 
the County Court and High Court.
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II. The limitation of workers’ rights
A. Dismissal
This chapter has already shown that British workers enjoy less 
employment protection than many others in Europe. Partly this is because 
of the legislation. Also, however, it is because of the way British judges have 
interpreted the legislation on individual dismissals to allow employers a large 
amount of leeway, thus bolstering the employer’s prerogative. To look in 
detail: there has been legislation on dismissal for the potentially fair reasons 
of conduct, capability, redundancy or some other substantial reason since 
1971 and the current legislation (Employment Rights Act 1996, s.98) 
provides as follows:
(4) […] the determination of the question whether the dismissal is 
fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)
a) depends on whether in the circumstances […], the employer 
acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient 
reason for dismissing the employee and
b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the 
substantial merits of the case.
Nevertheless, British judges, in a long line of cases, have put a gloss on 
the legislation and ruled that the employer is allowed a considerable degree 
of scope in determining what is reasonable. A seminal decision was by the 
Court of Appeal in British Leyland UK Ltd v. Swift as far back as 1981 when 
it held: « The correct test is: Was it reasonable for the employers to dismiss him? If 
no reasonable employer would have dismissed him, then the dismissal was unfair. 
But if a reasonable employer might reasonably have dismissed him, then the 
dismissal was fair […] Both views may be quite reasonable »6.
This was challenged 20 years later as a departure from the legislation in 
two cases that were decided together by the Court of Appeal: Post Office v Foley 
/ HSBC Bank v. Madden. In these cases, the employee had been dismissed 
for misconduct. Mr Foley, a postal worker, was given permission to leave his 
shift early to deal with a domestic problem. About an hour later, an off-duty 
manager reported seeing him in a nearby public house (pub). Mr Foley 
maintained that he had gone to the pub to call for a taxi and had left some 
time before the alleged sighting. The employers rejected that explanation 
and decided to dismiss him. An Employment Tribunal dismissed Mr Foley’s 
complaint of unfair dismissal. It found that the decision, though « harsh », 
was not unreasonable and was « mindful that we must not impose our decision 
6 Court of Appeal, Industrial Relations Law Reports, 1981, p. 93.
Susan CORBY
84
Institut Francophone pour la Justice et la Démocratie
upon that of a reasoned on-the-spot management ». The Employment Appeal 
Tribunal allowed Mr Foley’s appeal against that decision on the grounds 
that there had been no consideration as to what was the range of reasonable 
responses to the conduct in question.
Mr Madden was dismissed by the bank after internal investigations 
indicated that he had been involved in the misappropriation and fraudulent 
use of three customers’ debit cards. An Employment Tribunal found that 
the dismissal was unfair as the internal investigator’s conclusions had been 
accepted by the employer too readily and uncritically. The employer’s 
appeal was dismissed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal: it said that the 
Employment Tribunal was allowed to substitute its own view of what was 
reasonable for the employer’s view.
The Court of Appeal upheld the appeals by the two employers. It held 
that the band of reasonableness approach was binding, despite the fact that 
the Employment Appeal Tribunal had expressed unease at the fact that it 
had provided employers with a wide latitude. It said that the disapproval 
of the band of reasonableness was an « unwarranted departure from binding 
authority »7. Also, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Employment 
Tribunal was not allowed to substitute its own view of what is reasonable, 
for the employer’s view of reasonableness. It must base its decision on « the 
objective standards of the hypothetical reasonable employer which are imported 
by the statutory references to ‘reasonably or unreasonably’, and not by reference to 
their own subjective views of what they in fact would have done as an employer 
in the same circumstances »8. This contrasts with France, where conseillers may 
consider how the case on which they are adjudicating might be decided if 
there were similar facts in their own workplace.
It should be noted that up to now a case on the test of reasonableness 
of a dismissal has never gone to the Supreme Court, as the President of the 
Supreme Court has remarked. She added: « There may be very good reasons 
why no-one has challenged the test before. It follows that the law remains as 
it has been for the last 40 years and I express no view about whether that is 
correct »9.
Yet the latitude given to the employer under the test of reasonableness is 
not the only way that British judges have watered down the unfair dismissal 
provisions. The Employment Rights Act 1996 s.112 provides that the 
primary remedy for unfair dismissal is reinstatement or re-engagement, 
7 Court of Appeal, Industrial Relations Law Reports, 2000, p. 829.
8 Ibid., p. 831.
9 Supreme Court, Reilly v. Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council, Industrial Relations Law Reports, 
2018, p. 562.
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but the judges nearly always award monetary compensation. In less than 
1 per cent of successful cases is reinstatement or reengagement ordered10.
Moreover, judges have held that monetary compensation for unfair 
dismissal can only be awarded in respect of financial loss and not injury to 
feelings, (unlike discrimination in Britain or compensation for unjustified 
dismissal in New Zealand). The key case was Dunnachie v. Kingston upon Hull 
City Council 11. Mr Dunnachie was bullied and harassed by a colleague over 
a prolonged period. His employer failed to take any action, so Dunnachie 
resigned and claimed constructive unfair dismissal. The Employment 
Tribunal found for Dunnachie and, in assessing compensation, awarded 
extra damages for injury to feelings arising from the manner of the dismissal. 
The case was then appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which held 
that damages for non-financial loss were not recoverable, but on a further 
appeal, the Court of Appeal said that such damages were recoverable, as the 
law did not specify financial loss only. Finally, the case went to the House of 
Lords (now known as the Supreme Court), which held that the word « loss » 
in the legislation means financial loss only, so damages for injury to feelings 
were not recoverable.
Yet another example of judges allowing employers a considerable degree 
of scope is in respect of closures of a workplace as the judges have said 
that it is not their task to inquire into the reasons for the closure. This was 
illustrated in Moon and other v. Homeworthy Furniture (Northern) Ltd 12. In 
that case, the company’s factory in Sunderland was subject to a number of 
industrial disputes, after which the company closed the factory, saying it was 
not economically viable. The workers, who had all lost their jobs, argued 
that it was not a genuine redundancy and that the factory was economically 
viable. The Employment Appeal Tribunal, however, held that « No power is 
given to investigate the reasons for creating a redundancy. What may be done is 
to investigate the operating of a redundancy situation ». Similarly, the Court of 
Appeal held in a later case concerning the voluntary liquidation of a shipyard 
that « it is not open to the court to investigate the commercial and economic 
reasons which prompted the closure. It may be that in order to ensure fairness for 
the workforce the court should have this power, but in my view it does not have 
this power at present »13.
10 Weightmans, https://www.weightmans.com/insights/supreme-court-judgment-reminds-employers-
of-the-risk-of-reinstatement-orders/ accessed, 3.12.2019.
11 House of Lords. Industrial Relations Law Reports, 2004, p. 727.
12 Employment Appeal Tribunal, Industrial Relations Law Reports, 1976, p. 298.
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B. Tripartism and judicial discretion
When Employment Tribunals were first established in 1964, they 
comprised a professional judge and two lay members, one with experience as 
an employee and one as an employer. Slowly, however, Parliament legislated 
to ensure that decisions were by the professional judge alone. First, in 1993 
it legislated to enable the professional judge alone to adjudicate cases on 
the rights of employees where the employer had become insolvent and on 
deductions from wages. In 1998 it legislated to enable the professional judge 
alone to adjudicate cases on redundancy payments; in 1999 on national 
minimum wage claims and in 2009 on holiday pay. Then in 2012, amid 
some furore, it was decided that a professional judge alone could determine 
unfair dismissal cases.
Nevertheless, the professional judge has discretion to enable the Tribunal 
to become tripartite, that is to include two lay members on certain specified 
grounds. These are set out in the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 s.4(5) and 
include where « there is a likelihood of a dispute arising on the facts, which make 
it desirable for the proceedings to be heard » on a tripartite basis. Although in 
many cases the facts are in dispute, professional judges very rarely exercise 
their discretion14.
C. Industrial action
This chapter has already referred to the onerous legislation relating 
to strikes and industrial action short of a strike. Against that legislative 
backdrop, a key hallmark of the British system is an injunction, a court 
order, granted by a judge alone, that can be obtained by a directly aggrieved 
party to compel another party to refrain from (or do) a specific act. In the 
industrial relations context, it enables employers to obtain a court order 
to compel unions to desist from organising industrial action, pending a 
full hearing of the legal issues at a later date, when the injunction can be 
confirmed or rescinded. With this interim injunction, the burden of proof 
is not onerous, merely focusing upon whether an arguable case exists and 
any potential harm to the employer is such that an award of damages would 
not be a sufficient remedy. If an employer obtains an injunction, the union 
will have to suspend organising the strike and any other industrial action 
and may have to rerun a strike ballot. On the second occasion however, 
members may have changed their minds and not give the necessary approval. 
14 The author interviewed 12 Employment Judges, i.e. judges who sit full-time in Employment Tribu-
nals, as part of a project funded by Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. None had exercised their discretion to sit 
with lay members in the previous two years.
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Accordingly, in effect an employer who obtains an injunction for the most 
part prevents the strike from occurring. Full hearings are exceptional.
Gall15 examined employer applications for injunctions in respect of 
industrial action 2005-2014. He found that of the 65 applications, 36 (55 
per cent) were granted and 21 (32 per cent) refused. He referred to some 
notable cases where judges granted an injunction and consequently the 
employer succeeded because of a technicality. They include:
– 2007, a Royal Mail strike was injuncted because the union did not tell 
the employer exactly how many employees were employed;
– 2008, a Metrobus drivers’ strike was injuncted because the union 
took too long (48 hours) to fax the ballot result to the employer;
– 2009, a British Airways (BA) strike was injuncted because some 
members had already agreed to take voluntary redundancy;
– 2010, a Milford Haven port strike was injuncted because the notice 
of « continuous » and « discontinuous » action was given on one, not 
two sheets of paper.
There have, however, been a few decisions by judges on injunctions that 
have been less favourable to employers. In the case of the National Union of 
Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. Serco16, the employer failed to obtain 
an injunction. The Court of Appeal said that « The starting point should be 
that the 1992 Act should be given a likely and workable construction in the 
normal way and not strictly against unions ».
Similarly, the employer failed to obtain an injunction in Balfour Beatty v 
Unite The Union17 where the High Court said : « It cannot be right for a judge 
to hold that all reasonably practicable steps have not been taken merely because 
he or she would (as an outsider) have done something different. There must be 
leeway permitted for those who are familiar with the membership, and with the 
union’s particular problems of record keeping ».
It should be noted that these judgments were made before the more 
onerous provisions of the 2016 Trade Union Act were introduced, since when 
employers have had some success and some failures in respect of injunctions. 
For instance, in 2019 British Airways sought an injunction against its pilots 
(who had voted overwhelmingly for strike action), arguing that there were 
flaws in the way the union had organised the ballot and reported the results 
to the employer. The High Court, however, refused to grant an injunction 
15 Gregor GALL, « Injunctions as a legal weapon in collective industrial disputes in Britain 2005-
2014 », British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2017, 55(1), p. 187-214.
16 Court of Appeal, National Union of Rail, Maritime & Transport Workers v. Serco Ltd t/a Serco 
Docklands and Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen v. London & Birmingham Railway 
Ltd t/a London Midland, Industrial Relations Law Reports, 2011, p. 400.
17 High Court, Industrial Law Reports, 2012, p. 452.
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and the Court of Appeal dismissed the employer’s appeal18. On the other 
hand, in 2019 Royal Mail won an injunction against the Communication 
Workers’ Union. The employer claimed that the vote for industrial action 
(supported by 97 per cent on a 76 per cent turnout) was invalid because 
members had been encouraged to open their voting papers at work before 
they were delivered to their homes, thus there was de facto a workplace ballot 
which is unlawful19.
III. Promoting workers’ rights
So far this chapter has considered how judges, particularly those in the 
Court of Appeal, have limited workers’ rights. Now this chapter focuses 
on how judges have advanced workers’ rights, beginning with fees for 
Employment Tribunals.
A. Fees for Employment Tribunal claims
From its establishment in 1964 claims in the Employment Tribunal 
and appeals to the Employment Appeal Tribunal could be brought without 
paying any fee. By the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal Fees Order 201320 however, the Lord Chancellor introduced fees 
as from July 2013. To start a claim at an Employment Tribunal, an « issue 
fee » was payable; additionally, a « hearing fee » was payable when the claim 
was listed for hearing. The amounts of the issue fee and hearing fee varied 
depending on whether the claim was brought by a single claimant or a 
group, and on whether the claim was classified as type A or type B. There 
were over 60 types of claim defined as type A, while type B included unfair 
dismissal, equal pay, and discrimination claims. Type B claims were generally 
regarded as being more complex and taking more tribunal time (although 
they would not necessarily result in a higher monetary award than a type A 
claim). The total fees for a single claimant bringing a type A claim were £390 
(approximately 456 €); for a type B claim £1,200 (approximately 1 400 €). 
In the Employment Appeal Tribunal, further total fees of £1,600 (1 869 €) 
were payable, again in two stages. Unsurprisingly, the number of claims fell 




20 SI 2013/1893 (made under s.42 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007).
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after the fee system was introduced. In the year before fees were introduced 
there were 195,570 claims. In the following year there were 74,979 claims, 
a fall of 62 per cent21.
The government argued that the fee system prevented vexatious claims 
and provided that the user paid some of the cost of the Employment Tribunal 
system. There was, however, provision for full or partial remission of fees for 
claimants and appellants who satisfied certain statutory criteria relating to 
disposable capital and monthly income and statistics22 indicated that 30 per 
cent of those pursuing a type B claim received fee remission in full or in 
part. Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal had a 
discretionary power to order unsuccessful parties to pay the fees paid by the 
successful party, but recovery is a convoluted process.
Unison, a large public sector union, challenged the fees arguing that 
they interfered with the right of access to justice as statistics demonstrated, 
frustrated the operation of Parliamentary legislation granting employment 
rights, and unlawfully discriminated against women and other protected 
groups. Unison also pointed out that the majority of successful Employment 
Tribunal claims resulted in modest financial awards, and that some claims 
did not have a monetary value but were to enforce employment rights (such 
as a claim for written particulars of employment).
The challenge was rejected by the Divisional Court and the Court of 
Appeal and the case went to the Supreme Court, which quashed the fees 
with immediate effect23. The seven Supreme Court judges who heard the 
case unanimously held that the fees impeded access to the courts and, 
importantly, it said access to justice was a right under common law and not 
just European Union law.
In order for courts to perform their constitutional role, people 
must in principle have unimpeded access to them […] People 
and businesses need to know, on the one hand, that they will be 
able to enforce their rights if they have to do so, and on the other 
hand, that if they fail to meet their obligations, there is likely to 
be a remedy against them. When Parliament passes laws creating 
employment rights it does so not merely in order to confer benefits 
on individual employees, but because it has decided that it is in 
the public interest that those rights should be given effect.
It was also held that the Fees Order was indirectly discriminatory 
against women because the higher fees for type B claims (which include 
21 Ministry of Justice, Review of the Introduction of Fees, 2017, p. 79.
22 Ministry of Justice, Review of the Introduction of Fees, 2017, p. 84.
23 R. (on the application of UNISON) v. Lord Chancellor, Industrial Relations Law Reports, 2017, 911.
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sex discrimination claims) put women at a particular disadvantage in that 
a higher proportion of women bring type B than type A claims, and it had 
not been shown that charging of higher fees was a proportionate means of 
achieving the aims of the Fees Order.
One result was that the government not only ended the fee regime 
immediately, it also put in place a scheme to refund the fees paid, plus 0.5 per 
cent interest for each year that had passed. From the launch of the fee refund 
scheme in October 2017 to 31 March 2019, refunds worth £17,296,733 
(approximately 20 380 580 €) were made.24
It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not rule out fees 
completely. Its decision related to the high level of fees and the Conservative 
party is said to be wanting to reintroduce fees, albeit at a lower level25.
B. Zero hours workers
While the Supreme Court was the only court to declare that Employment 
Tribunal fees were unlawful, all the courts have played some part in giving 
certain employment rights to so called zero hours workers, that is casual 
workers. The number of zero hours workers has increased significantly as the 
gig economy has mushroomed with new digital platforms being developed. 
There were 225,000 people in the UK on zero hours contracts in 2000, but 
by 2018 this had risen to 780,000, an increase of 29 per cent26.
Under a zero hours contract, the employer is not obliged to provide a 
minimum number of hours. In law, however, the question is whether those 
on zero hours contracts are self-employed, that is an independent contractor, 
whether they are « workers », or whether they are « employees ». If they are 
classed as workers, they are entitled to the minimum wage, holiday pay and 
statutory sick pay on the same terms as employees. If they are classed as 
employees, they have in addition a right to redundancy pay and to claim 
unfair dismissal. To be a worker, a person must have to provide the service 
him/herself and cannot provide a substitute and has to be subject to the 
control of the employer.
A key decision was that by the Supreme Court in 201827 in a case brought 
by Mr Smith, who was a plumbing and heating engineer and undertook 
24 Ministry of Justice, Statistics on Employment Tribunal Fee Refunds, 20 October 2017-31 March 2019, 
Table ETFR 1.
25 BPE Solicitors LLP, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=326570e3-8b1c-4e1d-b311-
3625a6eeb6a3, accessed 2.12.2019.
26 Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/414896/employees-with-zero-hours-contracts-number/, 
accessed 2.12.2019.
27 Supreme Court, Industrial Relations Law Reports, 2018, p. 872.
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work for Pimlico Plumbers Ltd, which conducted a plumbing business in 
London. Mr Smith complained, inter alia, of unlawful deductions from 
wages, failure to pay statutory annual leave, and disability discrimination. 
The Supreme Court held that Mr Smith was a worker, despite the « carefully 
choreographed » contractual documentation which referred to him as an 
independent contractor. Mr Smith could only substitute another Pimlico 
operative, (not any other qualified plumber), was required to wear the 
branded Pimlico uniform, drive its branded van to which Pimlico applied 
a tracker, carry its identity card and closely follow the administrative 
instructions of Pimlico’s control room.
Similarly, the Employment Appeal Tribunal decided that Mr Lange and 
others, who were mini-cab drivers for Addison Lee, were workers28. Although 
they were described in the documentation as independent contractors 
and could choose the days and times that they logged on to the platform, 
they were trained by the company, which also checked their credentials. 
Furthermore, in practice, drivers had to accept a job straight away when 
notified of it. If they did not, and could not provide an acceptable reason, 
they could face sanctions. The Employment Appeal Tribunal also held that 
the whole of the time when the drivers were logged on was working time, 
and thus was covered by minimum wage calculations, even though for some 
of that time they were not actually carrying passengers.
Moreover, the Employment Tribunal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
and the Court of Appeal ruled that Uber drivers are workers, not independent 
contractors. The Court of Appeal, said: « The notion that Uber in London is a 
mosaic of 30,000 small businesses linked by a common ‘platform’ is to our minds 
faintly ridiculous »29. At the time of writing Uber has lodged an appeal with 
the Supreme Court.
Similarly, Employment Tribunals have ruled that Hermes van delivery 
drivers were workers, not independent contractors30, that bicycle couriers 
at E-Courier were workers31, as was a City Sprint delivery person, although 
since that decision City Sprint changed its contract to allow substitution32.
All the above cases are fact sensitive and judges have looked at what 
happens in practice, rather than the words in the written contract, but 
28 Employment Appeal Tribunal, Industrial Cases Reports, 2019, p. 637.
29 Court of Appeal, Uber BV v. Aslam and others, Industrial Relations Law Reports, 2019, p. 257.
30 The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jun/25/hermes-couriers-are-workers-
not-self-employed-tribunal-rules, accessed 10.12.2019.
31 Employee Benefits, https://employeebenefits.co.uk/tribunal-workers-employees-tupe/, accessed 
4.12.19.
32 The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/nov/15/citysprint-employment-rights-
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not every judicial decision has been as progressive as those above. For 
instance, the right to provide a substitute was fatal in a case brought by the 
Independent Workers Union of Great Britain seeking a judicial review of 
the decision of the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) turning down the 
union’s application for recognition for collective bargaining by Deliveroo in 
respect of a group of delivery « riders » in London. Under British law, a trade 
union can seek recognition from an employer only in respect of workers. 
The application foundered on the CAC’s finding that the Deliveroo (meal 
delivery) riders were not « workers’ » because the substitution clause in 
their contracts, which allowed them to pass a job on to others, was genuine 
and operated in practice. The High Court dismissed the union’s challenge 
to the CAC’s decision. It said: « The restriction of collective bargaining to 
those in an employment relationship was rationally connected to the objective 
of preserving freedom of business and contract by limiting the cases in which 
the burden of collective bargaining should apply » (author’s emphasis)33. This 
description of collective bargaining as a « burden », is an indication of judicial 
anti-collectivism.
Conclusions
Parliament has passed legislation restricting workers’ rights, particularly 
in respect of strikes and contested dismissals. As a result, workers have less 
rights than those in neighbouring countries. Against that background judges 
have a mixed record. On the one hand, judges in the Court of Appeal have 
made illiberal decisions in respect of contested dismissals and redundancy 
and, with a few exceptions, judges in the Court of Appeal and in the High 
Court have made anti-union decisions in respect of industrial action. On 
the other hand, the Supreme Court importantly struck down the legislation 
on fees to Employment Tribunals on the grounds that they restricted access 
to justice, and judges in all the relevant courts have extended the rights of 
workers on zero hours contracts in the gig economy, appraising the reality of 
the contract and not the contract’s wording. These decisions, however, have 
turned on their facts and neither the judges, nor Parliament have set out 
general principles.
Moreover, there are dark clouds ahead. The Conservative party has just 
won a general election. Although its manifesto says it will « raise standards 
in areas like workers’ rights », at the same time it has said it « will ensure that 
33 High Court Queen’s Bench Division, R (on the application of Independent Workers’ Union of Great 
Britain) v. Central Arbitration Committee, Industrial Relations Law Reports, 2019, p. 530.
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regulation is sensible and proportionate, and that we always consider the needs 
of small businesses »34. More ominously, its manifesto commits to further 
restrictions on strikes saying, « we will require that a minimum service operates 
during transport strikes […] it is not fair to let the trade unions undermine the 
livelihoods of others »35.
34 The Conservative and Unionist Party, Manifesto, 2019, p. 33.
35 Ibid., p. 27.
